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NSW power workers in their struggle for a 
shorter working week adopted worker control 
tactics last June. Their struggle became a foe 
al point in the general critical political situa 
tion that has arisen. All political and social 
groupings are more clearly defining their att­
itude towards the proposition that the 35 
hour week is an entirely realisable social 
reform NOW As well, the fact that power 
workers exercised workers’ control over av­
ailability of plant and generation of electrical 
power for four months has raised to new levels 
understanding by friend and foe alike, of the 
potentiality of worker-control tactics and rel 
evance to the movement for revolutionary 
change.
The CPA power branch discussed the exp­
eriences of the campaign. This article has 
been written by the branch itself. We bel­
ieve what they have to say can help the 
Left in assessing the lessons to date of this 
significant and unresolved continuing 
struggle
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HOW SHOULD THE PRESENT STAGE 
OF THE STRUGGLE BE ASSESSED?
Power workers, while continuing to cam 
paign for the 35-hour week have, following
majority decisions at regional mass meet­
ings, discontinued their control over plant 
and power output, at least for the present 
Some reasons for this can be found in other 
decisions taken by the 35-hour week comm 
ittee. It decided to support the ACTU app 
lication for shorter hours for power workers 
under Federal awards in other States, and 
called on the Australian Government to in 
tervene positively in the case. If successful 
there could be a “flow-on” to the State 
award under which they work 
But deeper reasons must be sought in the 
increasing political character the struggle 
assumed. It began as an apparently purely 
industrial one. The Askin State Liberal Gov 
ernment, irrespective of the Electricity 
Commission and the Industrial Commiss­
ion, had the power to grant or reject the 
35-hour week. If the government had gran 
ted it, this would have opened the way for 
its general introduction. But even this was 
not the main stumbling block. The self- 
action nature of the power workers’ struggle 
was a rock around which Askin couldn’t 
navigate. He failed to isolate and break 
their struggle, though he grew more skill 
ed in manipulating black-outs in efforts 
to turn the public against them. His att­
itude hardened in keeping with that of mon 
opoly and establishment opposition to 
any concession. In NSW Askin was actually 
assisted by Labor Opposition Leader Hills.’
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call to power workers to give up active 
struggle in return for the dubious prospect 
that he would grant the 35 hour week when 
Premier. For this and other reasons, Askin 
announced a snap election adding to the 
pressure bearing on power workers.
Askin and Co. felt they simply couldn’t 
concede the 35-hour week because this 
would have been a victory for workers’ 
control tactics, and would have spread these 
tactics to other industries. The rightwing 
and some others in the union movement, 
also didn’t like the tactic. These forces 
“went along” with workers’ control because 
they couldn’t do anything about it. As soon 
as they could, they steered the struggle into 
another arbitration inquiry, then used the el­
ection and the ACTU as a way out for them.
There was plenty that was positive in the 
situation power workers were in. The unity 
between wages and salaried division workers 
was never higher; in self-action they found a 
power to challenge the Electricity Commiss­
ion and the government; their fighting stren­
gth and organisation were intact; theirstrug- 
gle had involved the Australian Government 
and the ACTU,; their case was better and more 
widely known, with higher appreciation of 
the 35-hour week as an essential reform in 
our technological society. Their example of 
self-action had won them wide attention and 
support. All these gains remain, but in our 
opinion , in deciding against a proposal to 
themselves implement the 35-hour week, 
power workers failed at this stage (they 
could still do so later) to adopt an alternat­
ive or additional tactic that would have 
been an advance in self-action, strengthening 
their struggle, with favourable nation-wide 
repercussions.
In Northern NSW, where the main power 
stations are sited, both wage and salary 
workers are determined to carry on the 
fight, to again use the tactics they worked 
out - and to develop them further. And not 
only for the 35-hour week, but for other issues
THE NSW ELECTRICITY COMMISSION 
WILL NEVER BE THE SAME AGAIN - 
BOTH WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT 
RECOGNISE THIS.
There’s an even more general result from the 
struggle - the employers and the Liberal Par­
ty are forced to put forward “workers’ part
icipation” as an alternative to workers’ con­
trol. The NSW Liberal Party has just put out 
a pamphlet supporting "workers’ participat­
ion” , quoting what it means - appointment 
of union officials like Ducker, Egerton and 
Hawke to positions on boards of semi-govern 
ment enterprises! This is contrasted to work­
ers’ control. The struggle between these two 
ideas -- participation or control - will grow 
and workers are unlikely to accept this sort 
of phoney “participation”, still less since it 
is endorsed by Askin and the Liberals.
WHAT’S BEHIND THE DETERMINATION 
POWER WORKERS PUT INTO THEIR 
FIGHT FOR SHORTER HOURS ~ HOW 
DID THEY COME TO ADOPT WORKER - 
CONTROL TACTICS’
We think most significant was the determ­
ined resistance of workers to the effects of 
decentralisation and of ever-increasing tech­
nological development of the industry upon 
themselves as workers and human beings. 
These effects are compounded by the auth­
oritarianism of the Electricity Commission 
which reduces all considerations to one: 
what will contribute best to its continuing 
to provide cheap power mainly for indust­
rial growth and corporate profits.
The insecurity and limitations of small 
communities of short life, lonely jobs, jobs 
carrying increasing strain and responsibility, 
jobs with increasing purposelessness, and 
jobs for which workers acquired skills 
which have disappeared, the narrowing 
opportunity for promotion, and even jobs 
at all (e.g. it took 600 men at Bunnerong Pov 
er Station to produce 160 megawatts; at Lid< 
ell, 200 produce ten times as much). Over all 
is the feeling of alienation in a huge and grav­
ing complex. Add to this the erosion of wage 
through inflation; the changing nature of job 
and advances made in outside industry of 
some marginally better wages and conditions 
that supposedly once compensated power 
workers. From all this the 35-hour week off 
ered a tangible gain and became a deeply felt 
need.
And power workers felt it was entirely reas 
onable that they should have it. Productivity 
for them was not only expressed in figures
of a five-fold increase with costs cut by two- 
thirds, it was all around them, they worked 
among its manifestations. They also worked 
among Management and Administrative 
division of whom 40 per cent already had a 
35-hour week. Within the salaried division, 
the percentage is seventy-five! Is it any won­
der that it was the 35-hour week demand 
that brought salaried and wages division 
workers into active unity for the first time7 
"STRIKEBREAKERS” is a key word to 
describe the barrier to making their now 
united action industrially effective. The Com­
mission had cultivated antagonism between 
the two divisions, but its main counter to 
either, and now both, was the practice of 
using Professional Engineers, under its dir 
ection, to repair “black” plant and operate 
“black” controls. There was even a special 
“flying force” to rush to any crisis point. 
There was, too, among the workers, a strong 
trend towards the use of some new tactics 
and away from the traditional strike which 
would leave the engineers inside, and eff­
ective, and themselves outside, and ineff­
ective. In this impasse, a worker from the 
floor of a mass meeting at Vales Point Pow 
er Station proposed they apply to their ind­
ustry some of the tactics they had read or 
heard about from Haroo, the Opera House 
and the Clyde. And this they did, in a new 
and creative way! It is important to note 
that they applied worker control tactics to 
win a specific issue. But it is also important 
to note that the democratic control over 
their campaign, established after February, 
enabled them to discuss, decide and quickly 
and creatively apply those tactics. Workers’ 
control tactics were not imposed from out­
side; they were developed almost spontan­
eously by the workers themselves.
WHAT WERE THE IVDST IMPORTANT 
EVENTS AND THE MDST SIGNIFICANT 
FEATURES OF WORKER-CONTROL 
EXPERIENCES ... HOW EFFECTIVE WERE 
THE TACTICS7
Taking them in order "work-ins” at the 
vital generating stations and associated act 
ivities that routed the strikebreakers, with 
Munmorah the focal point. The Commission 
itself speaks of “up to 200 day-work maint 
enance men on the premises during the 
evening engaged in a ‘sit-in’” , etc. Also 
here took place the invasion of the "flying
force” escorted by 70 police to repair a 
“black” coal conveyor-belt.
To avoid violence they were allowed in 
and they repaired the belt to the accompani­
ment of verbal comments from maintenance 
men, only to have the repaired belt declared 
"black” by the operators!
This cemented the new unity in action. Mun 
morah was literally in the hands of the work 
ers for a period. Similar police-escorted invas 
ions were made at Bunnerong and Pyrmont 
stations in a desperate bid to extract the max 
imum megawatts from what are normally 
stand-by stations. Their reception led to man 
agement in each case requesting their with­
drawal. The engineers eventually refused to 
do anything but their own duties.
Then came the actual determination by the 
workers of what power was to be generated 
within the system, an action as much out of 
control of the Labor Council officials as it 
was of the Electricity Commission. Then 
confrontation with Askin’s deliberate black 
outs, and forced lay-offs of hundreds of 
thousands of workers, resolved when metal 
workers in a few Sydney factories them­
selves switched on power in defiance of 
phoney restrictions.
Following another “No” from a second 
Inquiry, the confrontation resumed with 
a principled decision by power workers to 
control output so that employers were den 
ied the chance of a mass stand-down of 
workers, but with Askin more skilled in 
manipulating blackouts. Large press ad­
vertisements blamed the workers but were 
met by similar advertisements exposing 
Askin, first by some unions together with 
the Workers’ Control Movement, later and 
belatedly by the Labor Council. Supporting 
leaflets and other material began to take 
effect.
The most significant feature was workers' 
self-action. No one could tell them what to 
do at the critical stages. More significantly, 
they didn’t need anyone to tell them. They 
found and applied the answer themselves. 
There was an instance at one power station 
of workers restoring plant over a week-end, 
without pay, so that operators could main­
tain the level of power the 35-hour week 
committee had pledged to provide In 
workers’ control they found tactics giving 
unprecedented power to challenge the 
Electricity Commission and the government
The organisations which promoted and ex
pressed the workers’ self-action:rank and 
file job committees, worked out the forms 
of action which were organised by rank and 
file elected co-ordinators (one for each 
division. Overall decisions were made by 
job-elected delegates on the 35-hour week 
committee. The latter body was originally 
set up by the Labor Council in 1971, ass­
uming its militant role last February after 
a passive 18 months waiting for the first 
Inquiry to say “No”.
The rightwing Labor Council officials, 
sponsors of the futile Inquiry, simply had 
to “go along” with the advanced tactics.
But they always sought to divert the struggle 
into "responsible” channels, even publicly of 
offering compromises without consulting 
power workers. The Labor Council inhib­
ited the freest development of self-action. 
But there was valuable co-operation from 
some unions inside and outside the indust­
ry, notably the AMWU’s initiation of metal 
workers’ switch-on in June (but also others 
not on the Left).
WHAT GROWTH OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
WAS EVIDENT ANDNG THE WORKERS 
ARISING FROM WORKER-CONTROL 
TACTICS?
Of the 5,000 men in struggle, those in the 
vital generating stations were involved dir­
ectly and continuously, others at different 
degrees and times, and still others were 
relatively remote from the action. So part­
icipation ranged from“working-in”; con­
trolling plant and output (a highlight was 
that of the operator ordered by the Min­
ister for Power, Fife, standing beside him, 
to maintain output, replying that he was 
instructed by the co-ordinator to cut 
output .... and did so!). Some others on­
ly provided financial support. So the 
impact of the experiences on workers’ 
thinking was varied. Even so, we felt 
that the concept of workers' control had 
been raised in a real way even for power 
workers far from the point of action.
All agree that there is a new sense of 
solidarity and strength and that future 
claims will be made from a position of 
strength.
Clearly, the very vote to apply the new 
tactics represented a leap in thinking as 
did each following step up to and incl­
uding the conscious confrontation with 
Ark in.
A most significant instance was the 
call from the "work- and sit-ins” at 
Munmorah and Vales Point Power Stat­
ions for volunteers from the metropol­
itan area to help picketing. All who res­
ponded were welcomed regardless of who 
they were, what they were, or where they 
came from. Other examples are the firm­
ly disciplined and non-violent action by 
workers to counter and break the invasion 
of police-escorted strikebreakers at Mun­
morah, Pyrmont and Bunnerong. At the 
latter station some workers were put on 
special watch over a few of their mates, 
not so much for their militancy as their 
hot-headedness, that they might not be 
provoked.
The “switchon” by metal workers in 
June which exposed Askin’s phoney re­
strictions was a tremendous morale 
booster for power workers. A view was 
expressed that its lessons were reflected 
in the majority decision to provide en­
ough power to keep industry going and 
so defeat Askin’s planned provocation 
to shut down the industry.
WHY, DESPITE DISCUSSION AND 
PUBLICITY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY 
HAVE POWER WORKERS NOT TAKEN 
OR IMPLEMENTED THE 35-HOUR 
WEEK THEMSELVES?
This tactic has been discussed on and off 
since it was first raised in 1971. Its first app 
eal came from the fact that this was the way 
breakthroughs to shorter hours had been 
made In the past. After February, it was the 
one proposal among those that launched a 
democratic action campaign that was not 
carried out. The idea was discussed of work­
ing the shorter week in different stations to 
demonstrate its feasibility.
Differences in attitudes appeared between 
the two divisions on the proposal. Many wac 
men, seeing the key roled played by operate 
thought that only they could make the tacti 
effective, as they thought that taking it 
themselves would only give five hours’ pay 
to the Commission. Many salaried men onl> 
saw the problem that, with continuous shift 
work, reduced hours needed more operators 
to fill the rosters if the previous strikebreaki 
engineers were to be kept away from the coi 
trols.
Views expressed in the discussion were thai 
of necessity and for a time, workers’ control 
over plant and output absorbed the workers
attention and initiative.
Not enough preparation had been given to 
working out the how, when, where and why 
the 35 hours should be implemented: that 
implementation had never been lifted out oi 
its traditional concept and sufficiently rel­
ated to the actuality of their struggle. This 
view saw it as the next step in developing 
workers’ self-action and control and a fresh 
initiative in their challenge to Askin. At 
only one of the regional mass meetings was 
implementation seriously debated. Wages 
men who had participated in the sit-in and 
what followed discussed taking the 35-hois 
week for an hour and a half before deciding 
narrowly against it (by 302 votes to 250).
HOW DID THE LEFT CONTRIBUTE TO
THE STRUGGLE...... HOW SHOULD THE
BRANCH ASSESS ITS OWN CONTRIBUT­
ION?
The greatest contribution was the popular­
isation of the concepts of workers’ control 
and the publication of experiences which 
showed its immediate relevance. It was 
ideas taken from what they load read or 
heard of Haroo, the Clyde, the Opera House 
and the Newcastle Easter conference which 
sparked off their own tactic. These were 
seen as revealing both the capacity of work­
ers and the kind of leadership they wanted.
The lessons from this struggle, all agreed, 
confirm the relevance of the CPA’s policies. 
Several some-time members and friends of 
the party in the industry who doubted these 
policies spoke about how workers’ action 
liad shown we were right. Because of these 
policies, Tribune’s coverage alone reflected 
the initiative and enthusiasm of the struggle.
The branch itself, in 1970, published a 
pamphlet "What is the Future for Power 
Workers?”. This related the concepts of 
workers' control to the industry, and its 
job bulletins since then have continued to 
do so. They, too, have had a considerable 
effect.
The Power branch is mainly Sydney- 
based; that was a weakness. In the North, 
a CPA member, Ron Ross, was elected 
wages division co-ordinator, and he played 
an important part in the campaign.
We think that the CPA branch, and later 
the Workers' Control Movement, played 
quite an important part by raising new 
ideas, from as early as 1967 in raising the 
new direction the industry had taken.
Then came the spreading of the workers’ 
control idea, which was taken up and so 
creatively developed. We see this as the 
Party's main contribution, not just in 
this struggle, but in the whole movement.
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